INTRODUCTIOP
rogress in reducing mortality can be conceived in two ways. Demographers generally view mortality change as change in the force of mortality and associated life table statistics for a population. Most laypersons, on the other hand, especially physicians and other health and safety personnei, perceive a reduction in mortality as being achieved by saving the lives ofindividuals faced with death. A demographer might report that the force of mortality at age 50 among V.S. males was cut in half from 1900 to 1980, from 1.6 percent to 0.8 percent. A public health specialist might focus attention on the lives that were saved in 1980 compared with 1900 because of new surgical and medical procedures; the introduction of penicillin, polio vaccines, and other pharmaceuticals; better nutrition and sanitation; improved automotive safety; less cigarette smoking; faster and more effective ambulance service; and so on.
These two conceptions are not contradictory: both have validity; both aid understanding. Furthermore, both models are abstractions. Demographers are so accustomed to thinking about the force of mortality that they sometimes forget how far removed this construct is from the empirical counts of deaths and population numbers on which it is ultimately based. The notion of lifesaving is also an idealization. A lifeguard rnay believe he or she saved a swimmer from drowning, and a surgeon may believe an operation averted death; but even in these cases, there is uncertainty about what would have happened otherwise, and this uncertainty increases when the lifesaving is attributed to, say, better nutrition or healthier life styles. If, however, progress is achieved against mortality, then it seems reasonable to say that lives have been saved, that is, that deaths have been averted, even though the identity ofthe individuals saved and the cause ofthe lifesaving may not be known or even knowable.
In this paper we develop a model that combines the analytical power of the concept of tbe force of mortality with tbe appeal and relevance of tbe notion of lifesaving. We explore botb bow lifesaving alters life table statistics and, conversely, bow change in a life table, in particular cbange resulting from a reduction in tbe force of mortality at all ages, can be interpreted in terms of lifesaving. If lives are saved, bow will tbe force of mortality cbange? If tbe force of mortality is reduced, how many lives will be saved?* Our goal is insight into tbe relationsbip between averting deaths and reducing tbe force of mortality. We develop a model-an imperfect one because it neglects heterogeneity (and much else), but a useful starting point for developing understanding of tbe Iinkage between lifesaving and life tables. We present six tables that include some 534 statistics, not because the statistics are intrinsically interesting or worth calculating for alllife tables, but because they aid insight and understanding by providing specific illustrations of the magnitude of different aspects of this relationship.
A DEMOGRAPHIe MODEL OF LIFESAVING Let f. L(x) represent the force of mortality at age x. Let l(x) represent survivorship (with a radix of one):
Let fix) denote the density distribution of deaths:
(1) (2) And let e(x) represent life expectancy:
where w is an age beyond which no one survives.
Suppose that the force of mortality is reduced to a new level, f.L*(x) , such that
Let l*(x),f*(x), and e*(x) represent survivorship, the density distribution of deaths, and life expectancy under the new mortality regime, respectively. The reduction in the force of mortality can be defined by either 
where Ameasures the absolute reduction in the force of mortality and () measures the relative reduction,
Note that the two variables are related by (8) Consider the model aepicted in figure 1 . Everyone initially starts off in the leftmost box. From each box the force of mortality is f.L*(x), so the overall force of mortality must also be f.L*(x). There is a A(x) intensity of transition to the next box. Because
, the rate of attrition from each box is simply the old force of mortality, f.L(x). Thus the transition from one box to the next can be considered to under the new regime, this JL(x) is divided into two parts-a new force of mortality JL*(x) and a force of lifesaving A(X). At each age, a proportion 5(x) of the individuals who would have died are now resuscitated and given another chance. Individuals can be saved any number of times: the various boxes from left to right include individuals resuscitated zero, one, two, three, and so on, times. The model assurnes that a resuscitated individual faces the same life chances as an individual who has not been saved. This commonly made assumption, which is analogous to the assumption of independent competing risks, is unrealistic, as discussed at length elsewhere (e.g., Vaupel, Manton, and Stallard 1979; VaupeI1986) . Nonetheless the assumption is useful because it simplifies the analysis, permitting some first steps to be taken that aid understanding and insight. Let l;(x) denote the probability that an individual will be alive and in state i at age x, where i represents the number of times the individual' s life has been saved, i = 0, 1, 2, . . .. For i > 0, the l;s pertain to revival-survivorship or "revivorship."
Because the total force of attrition from state zero is simply JL(x), the value of lo(x) equals l(x); that is, survivorship in the first box is the same as survivorship under the old mortality regime. Thus
Ifformulas could be found for the revivorship statistics lj(x), then l*(x), survivorship under the new mortality regime, could be related to lex), survivorship under the old regime. Furthermore, formulas (2) and (3) could then be used to analyze the change in the distribution of deaths and in life expectancy.
THE CHANCES OF REPEATED RESUSCITATION
Our central result is thus the derivation of formulas for the l; (x) , that is, the probability that an individual will be resuscitated i times by age x. The formulas turn out to be remarkably simple:
It follows from (1) and (5) that
(10) (11) (12) In the special case in which progress against mortality is uniform at all ages,
it is not difficult to show that formula (2) reduces to
The quantity A(x) , which plays such a fundamental role in our results, can be interpreted as the cumulative hazard averted or the cumulative intensity of lifesaving.
The formula in (0) is reminiscent ofthe formula for a Poisson distribution. Indeed, one way of proving (0) [We prove, in (38) , that A(x) is not only the cumulative hazard averted but also the average number of times death has been averted among survivors at age x.] An alternative proof of (0) is by mathematical induction. Two steps are required:
proving that (0) holds when i = 0 and proving that if (0) holds for i-I, it also holds for i. For the first step, note that the differential equation
The differential equation has the familiar solution
When the radix /0(0) is one, as assumed here, this reduces to the desired result:
The differential equation describing li(X) is
Assuming that (0) holds for i-I, (8) can be reexpressed as
with the solution
where c is a constant that must be zero to satisfy (20) at age zero. QED.
(20) It follows from (10) that the relationship between survivorship under the new and old mortality regimes, as given by (9), can be rewritten as
By analogy with the Poisson distribution, the sum in (22) can be determined and change in survivorship can be summarized as
This expression can also be derived directly from (12). For our present purposes, however, it is the decomposition of lifesaving in (21) and (22) that is of interest.
To illustrate this decomposition, survivorship statistics for U.S. females are presented in table 1 for three pairs of mortality regimes: 1980 versus 1900, 2050 versus 1980, and 2050 versus 1900 . The values of l*(x) and l(x) were taken from Faber (1982) ; the values of A(x) were computed, using (12), from these l*(x) and l(x) values.
The values of the various revivorship statistics li(X) were then calculated by using (21). It can be seen from the table that at 1980mortality rates, some 18,933 females out of a birth cohort of 100,000 would survive to age 90, compared with only 1,719 individuals at 1900rates. Hence some 17,214hypotheticallife table lives were saved.
Of these resuseitated women, 4,124 had their life saved onee, 4,947 had their life saved twiee, ... , and 1,813 had their life saved at least five times.
Note that although the progress aehieved in saving lives is additive, the breakdown of this progress by number of resuseitations is not additive. The progress aehieved from 1900 to 1980 saved the lives of 1,478 women who went on to beeome eentenarians, and the progress from 1980 to 2050is foreeast to save the lives of 7,220 women who eventually reaeh age 100; altogether, 9,198 more women (1,478 plus 7,220) will beeome eentenarians at 2050 rates than at 1900 rates. At 1980 rates relative to 1900 rates, however, only 609 eentenarians had their lives saved five times or more, and at 2050 rates relative to 1980 rates, only 346 eentenarians benefited so mueh from lifesaving. But at 2050 rates relative to 1900 rates, fully 6,585 eentenarians-about two-thirds of all eentenarians-will have been reprieved from death at least five times. Some of these women would have been saved three times beeause of the progress aehieved from 1900 to 1980 and an additional two times beeause of the progress from 1980 to 2050: it is the existenee of sueh multiple lifesaving paths between 1900 and 2050 that explains why so many women will be saved so many times as mortality is redueed from 1900 levels to 2050 levels.
POSTPONING DEATHS
The density distribution of deaths (or alternatively, of life spans), .f(x), is given by the produet of }J-(x) and I(x). It follows from (21) that the density under the redueed mortality is
This formula eould be used to break deaths down into first deaths, seeond deaths, and so on, in the sense that seeond deaths oeeur among those reprieved onee. The proportion of deaths that oeeur from eaeh state depends simply on the proportion of surviving individuals aged x in eaeh state. Formulas (10) and (12) imply that the proportion of surviving individuals in eaeh state is given by
whieh, as noted above, is a Poisson distribution. The proportions presented in table 2 were eaIculated by using this formula, with the values of 1\(x) eomputed, using (12), from available survivorship statisties. As might be expeeted, hardly anyone is saved from death more than onee before age 10, but the proportion benefiting from repeated resuscitation grows with age. Inpartieular, 71.4 pereent ofthe eentenarians alive in 2050 (and 71.4 pereent of the eentenarians who die in 2050) will have been reprieved five or more times from the deaths they would have suffered at 1900 rates. It follows from (24) and (25) that
and then from (12) that Because death is never avoided but merely postpuned, a life saved today will contribute an extra death in the future. Hence the value of f*(x) must eventually exceed the value of j{x). Both (26) and (27) are consistent with this, although the necessity of a crossover is perhaps more evident from (26). Initially A(O) is zero, so the expression in (26) must be negative. If there is no age xo after which the value of S(x) never exceeds zero, then A(x) increases indefinitely: consequently, the value of the expression must in time become positive. On the other hand, if there is an age xo after which o(x) stays at zero, then the expression must be positive after this age. To iIlustrate this crossover, it is convenient to consider the simple case in which S(x) equals 0 for all x, that is, a constant proportion of deaths are averted at all ages. In this case, it can readily be shown that and hence, using (27) , that
A crossover such that f*(x) begins to exceed j{x) occurs at the age xo, where the expression in (29) equals zero. This age is the age such that (30) Thus if 0 is 0.5, then l(xO) equals 0.25. For D.S. males at 1980 rates, survivorship is down to 25 percent at age 82: if male death rates were cut in half, deaths under the new regime would start exceeding deaths at 1980 rates after age 82. 
and the relative change in life expectancy can be represented as
t.e(O)/e(O)~,~r'lf: lex) dx, (33)
Table 3 presents a break down of the change in life expectancy from one mortality regime to another, for nine different pairs of regimes. Life expectancies in 1980 versus 1900,2050 versus 1980, and 2050 versus 1900 are compared for males as wen as for females. In addition, comparisons are drawn between male and female life expectancies at the mortality rates in 1900, 1980, and 2050: the malelfemale analysis is possible because male mortality rates either equal (for an practical purposes) or exceed female rates at an ages in each of the three years. In the comparison of 2050 with 1900,note that a significant amount oflife expectancy, nearly a quarter of a year for females, is added by saving lives 9 times: a cat may have 9lives, but progress in reducing mortality will give some humans at least 10. In the comparison of female and male life expectancies, most of the additional female life expectancy is attributable to saving lives once: if an males had their lives saved once, the gap between male and female life expectancy would be cut by 96 percent, 80 percent, and 79 percent at 1900, 1980, and 2050 rates, respectively.
In the simple case in which the same proportion of deaths are averted at an ages, (33) can be reexpressed as (34) 
Note that H 1 is the familiar expression for the entropy or information measure H used by Keyfitz (1985) to analyze how a proportionate change in mortality rates affects life expectancy; it is clear from (34) that this expression for H is valid when ois smalI. [See Vaupel and Yashin (1985) for further discussion of this and of the logic of approaches based on finite differences vs. infinitesimal differentials. Also see Keyfitz (1985) for formulas like (34) and (35), based on a Taylor series expansion.] Following the method used by Vaupel (1986) , an alternative expression for H, can be developed:
H,~f: I'(x)I(x)e(x)( -In l(x))H/i! dx/ J:I (x) dx. (36)
This expression for H 1 is the expression for H used by Vaupel (1986) to analyze how change in age-specific mortality affects life expectancy. Table 4 presents values of H 1 through H 9 for V.S. males and females at 1900, 1980, and 2050 mortality rates. Note how slowly the values of H, fall off as i increases. It is not difficult to show that the sum of the HiS increases without limit as i increases, which is intuitively reasonable because if lives are saved over and over again indefinitely, then life expectancy should grow without limit. The values of H, fall off as i increases because persons whose lives are saved repeatedly are likely to be older persons who face high rates of death: if mortality rates were constant over age, the values of the HiS would all be the same (and equal to one), and if mortality rates declined with age, the values of the HiS would be increasing. By multiplying the value of H, by the prevailing life expectancy, the life years gained by saving a person's life the ith time can be calculated. Vaupel and Yashin (1985) explained the logic of this in detail; the basic idea is that if a random person's life is saved the ith time, then he or she can expect to live H, x e(O) years in state i. These additional years of life expectancy represent the benefit of saving a life the ith time, not including the further benefit that might arise if the individual were saved again, the (i + 1)st time. Table 5 summarizes the effects of repeatedly averting death by presenting the average life spans of people saved not at all, once and only once, twice and only twiee, and so on up to nine times, in 1900, 1980, and 2050, for V.S. females and males.
The high values of H 1 in 1900 imply that if every female's first death could be averted, 23.56 years would be added to female life expeetaney, inereasing life expeetaney from 49.07 years to 72.63 years. Similarly, averting every male's first death would inerease male life expeetaney by 24.04 years, from 46.56 years to 70.60 years. It is intriguing to note that the aetual inereases in female and male life expeetaney from 1900 to 1980 are roughly eomparable to these gains: the progress aehieved is equivalent to saving every female's life a bit more than onee and every male's life a bit less than onee.
At 1980 and 2050 rates, averting everyone's first death would be about half as benefieial: female life expeetaney would inerease about 12 years and male life expeetaney by somewhat more than 13 years. Averting everyone's seeond death would add another 5V2 years to female life expeetaney and another 6V2 years to male life expeetaney, putting female life expeetaney in 2050 at nearly 102 years and male life expeetaney at nearly 96 years.
Eaeh additional death averted adds fewer years to life expeetaney, but the eumulative effeet ean be substantial. The average male faeing 1980 death rates will survive to eelebrate his 100th birthday if his life is saved five times. At 2050 rates if a woman's life were saved nine times, she could expect to live to age 118.
ROW MANY TIMES RAS YOUR LIFE BEEN SAVED?
If mortality rates are redueed, some people will have their lives saved onee, some twice, and some many times before they finally die, and other people will die at the same age they would have died before. Let n(x) be the average number of times a synthetic eohort of people aged x have had their lives saved beeause mortality rates followed a lower trajeetory: (38) Thus A(x), the key variable in many of our formulas, can be interpreted not only as the cumulative intensity of lifesaving but also as the average number of times death has been averted.
The average number of times a newborn ean expeet to have his or her life saved before inevitable, final death is given by Table 6 .-Average number of resuscitations for those alive at selected ages [n(a)] and expected number of resuscitations in a lifetime (ti), for U.S. females and males at 1980 vs. 1900, 2050 vs. 1980, and 2050 vs. 1900 
This value summarizes the differenee between two mortality regimes and thus might be used to measure the distanee between two levels of mortality. Change in life expeetaney is the measure usually used; fi represents an alternative that ean be employed when one mortality trajectory is at least as low as a second trajectory, at all ages. Table 6 presents values of n(x) at selected ages as weIl as ii for nine different pairs of mortality regimes; beeause the mortality rates are period rates, the results pertain to hypotheticallife table lives. On average, the older a person gets, the more times his or her life has been saved: the average 100-year-old female at 2050 versus 1900 rates will have had her life saved six times. At birth, a newborn girl at 2050 versus 1900 rates ean expect to be reprieved from death more than 2.7 times, whereas a newborn boy can expeet only 1.7 resuscitations: that extra life measures the greater progress made in lowering female mortality. The gap between male and female life chanees can be measured by comparing the two regimes: To achieve female life expectaney in 1900, the average male would have to be resuscitated 0.11 times; in 1980 and 2050, the required average number of resuscitations is six times higher.
When 8(x) is constant, the formula for neollapses to the remarkably simple result
Thus if mortality is cut in half at all ages, a newborn ean expeet to be reprieved from death once; if mortality is cut to a quarter of its original level, the average newborn will be resuseitated three times.
That the average newborn can expeet to be reprieved from death fi times does not mean that all newborns will be reprieved fi times. On the contrary, some members of the birth eohort will benefit many times from lifesaving and others will not benefit at all. Consider the simple case in which mortality rates are cut in half at all ages, such that n = 1. At the moment death would have occurred, half of the individuals are reprieved-and the other half die as before. This same bifurcation occurs among those resuscitated once, then among those resuscitated twice, and so on, Thus half of the eohort do not benefit from the lifesaving, a quarter are reprieved onee, an eighth are reprieved twice, and an eighth are reprieved more than twice. The quarter who are reprieved once and the eighth who are reprieved twice each account for a quarter of the total reprieves: this means that the fortunate eighth who are reprieved more than twice account for fully half of the total reprieves. There is, in short, a concentration of resuscitation such that an eighth of the people get half of the benefits. This concentration arises even though, indeed because, the process of lifesaving is completely democratic-everyone has an equal chance, at birth, of having his or her life saved. As in many other situations, an equitable process leads to a very unequal outcome. (For further discussion of concentrations in populations, see Vaupel1985 and Vaupel and Goodwin 1986 ).
EXTENSIONS
In companion papers (Vaupel 1986; Vaupel and Yashin 1985) , we initiated some lines of analysis that, combined with the approach presented here, could lead to some additional results of interest.
1. Vaupel (1986) analyzes how change in age-specific mortality affects life expectancy. His approach, which is based on methods of differential calculus, is useful when small changes in age-specific mortality are being considered. When age-specific mortality changes substantially, the approaches proposed by Pollard (1982) and a United Nations study (1982) are appropriate. An alternative decomposition of the effects of age-specific mortality change on life expectancy could be based on the notion of repeated resuscitation.
2. The lifesaving model developed here assumes that all individuals face the same chances of death and that the resuscitated have the same life chances as those who did not have to be saved from death. It seems c1ear, however, that individuals differ in their frailty (Vaupel, Manton, and Stallard 1979) and that this heterogeneity will alter the impact of lifesaving on life table statistics. The results in the current paper could be extended along the lines discussed in Vaupel (1986) and Vaupel and Yashin (1985) .
3. In Vaupel and Yashin (1985) we developed a model, called the second-chance model, that permits individuals' lives to be saved once but only once. A comparison of that model with the repeated resuscitation model could yield some stimulating insights, For instance, is it better to save everyone's life once or to save lives once on average? The second-chance model may be useful in evaluating the effects of heterogeneity in life chances, since the mortality rates of those who are resuscitated can be set at a higher level than the rates for those whose lives have not been saved.
The illustrations presented in this paper have all concerned human mortality, but studies of other kinds of population attrition-pertaining to morbidity, marriage, divorce, abortion, unemployment, animal stocks, pest control, equipment failure, and so on-might also benefit from application of the notion of lifesaving and the repeated-resuscitation model. Indeed, in some of these areas, the model may be especially relevant and useful because lifesaving may be under the direct and effective control of adecision maker. Consider, for instance, the case of equipment that can be repaired (thus resuscitated) if it fails. Our case corresponds to the situation with "minimal repair" analyzed in some recent papers on reliability theory (Natvig 1985; Norros 1986) . The model could be used to investigate the optimal number of times the equipment should be repaired, the expected number of times the equipment will be repaired before ultimate scrapping, and the concentration of repair among the equipment population. In an example analogous to that given above, it eould be shown that an eighth of the equipment requires half of the repairs-even though there are no lemons, all of the equipment having equal chances of failure.
CONCLUSION
The notion of lifesaving ean be combined, as this paper has illustrated, with standard methods of demographie analysis to yield insights about how progress against mortality influenees patterns of survivorship, the density distribution of deaths, and life expeetaney. Furthermore, thinking about progress against mortality in terms of lifesaving-for example, the number of times a newborn's life will be saved if mortality is redueed from one level to another-helps clarify the nature and signifieanee of this progress. NOTE * While this article was in production for publication, we came across an article by Mitra (1979) that developed a model and derived formulas similar to ours for the special case in which the relative reduction in the force of mortality at age x, the function we call 5(x) , is constant at an ages.
